

VITOMIR MITEVSKI

Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts
Skopje

UDC:165.24(38)

ELEMENTS OF *THEŌRIA* IN HERACLITUS?

Abstract: 1. The fragments of Heraclitus B 101, B 116, B 45, and B 115 (enumeration: D/K) are challenging to interpret not only because of their uncertain authenticity but primarily because they suggest that Heraclitus had a specific form of self-knowledge. 2. Although there are places in Heraclitus where it seems that it is sensualism (fr. B 55), there are also fragments that marginalize the importance of the senses in process of knowing oneself (fr. B 34 and B 19). In some cases, the act of listening to the Logos is metaphorical (fr. B 50), and the criterion of knowing oneself is bound exclusively to the soul (fr. B 107). 3. Fr. B 101 refers to the soul as the key medium of knowing the meaning of knowing oneself. In the absence of clear internal semantic context, this message is explained in comparison with fr. B 116, B 45 and B 115. Those fragments speak of "feeding" and "growth" of the Logos in the soul, which indirectly indicates a kind of process of knowing the self. 4. On the basis of this analysis, there is room to say that in Heraclitus we find elements of non-verbal, non-sensory and non-objective self-knowledge that could be interpreted as a beginning of the idea of *theōria*, well known in later ancient philosophy.

There is a group of fragments in Heraclitus (fr.: B 101, B 116, B 45, and B 115)¹ whose meaning causes dilemmas and radical departures among interpreters. All these fragments refer in a direct or indirect way to a specific form of knowledge that cannot be unambiguously defined. In Fr. 101 B, which reads ἐδιζήσα-
μην ἐμεωυτόν, it seems that Heraclitus is speaking about form of self-knowledge. We can find something similar in fr. B 116: ἀν-
θρώποισι πάσι μέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑωυτούς καὶ σωφρονεῖν.

For M. Conche, these two fragments support the notion that Heraclitus considered himself as a man of free thought, indepen-

¹ If not indicated, the enumeration of Heraclitus' fragments is given according to the Diels/Kranz edition (D/K). We accept this enumeration not only because it has been regularly upheld as the yardstick in many subsequent critical editions of Heraclitus, but also because Serge Mouraviev generally uses it in his *Heraclitea*, a monumental work for which we are confident will long remain authoritative in research on Heraclitus.

dent of other people.² Ch. Kahn argued that fragments B 101 and B 116 were a "modern reading of the Delphi *gnōthi sauton*".³ K. Reinhardt claimed that for the first time in Greek philosophy Heraclitus discovers the cognitive power of the soul as a special form of self-knowledge in fr. B 101.⁴ Analyzing the same fragment, W. K. C. Guthrie concluded that Heraclitus was actually speaking about intuitive knowledge.⁵

These few examples suffice to demonstrate that the space for interpretative solutions is quite wide. Questionable authenticity of the fragments is the reason that some researchers completely reject and ignore them. An additional difficulty is the lack of unambiguous context of speech in each single fragment.

If we temporarily place the authenticity of the fragments to the side as a point that can be further argued, we are left with the broad context of that which Heraclitus says about knowledge in other places. Thus it seems best to focus on those fragments that are generally accepted as authentic.

Fr. B 1 (= Mouraviev F 1 a)⁶ is widely accepted as authentic, and from it we can single out the words of Heraclitus: τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκούσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον. γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε, ἀπίροισιν εἰκάσι πειρώμενοι κα(ὶ ἐ)πέων καὶ ἔργων τοιοῦτων ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγέυμαι, διαίρέων κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φράζων ὅπως ἔχει.⁷

From these words Mouraviev, for example, draws the conclusion that Heraclitus opens the central theme of his book – the knowledge of the principle that governs all things, i.e. λόγος.⁸ Kahn even asserts that in this passage Heraclitus is "inspired by

² Conche, 1986, p. 231.

³ Kahn, 1979, p. 116–117.

⁴ Cf. Reinhardt, 1977, p. 201: "erst Heraklit 'durchforschte sich selbst', erst er entdeckte die Seele für die Erkenntnis".

⁵ Guthrie, 1977, p. 419.

⁶ The fragment is quoted according to the edition of Mouraviev, *Heraclitea* III.3.B/i.

⁷ Translation of fr. B 1 by Mouraviev (= F 1a): *Though this logos is here evermore men have no understanding both ere they hear it and having heard firstly. For although every thing occurreth according to this logos, they are like the untired when they try such words and deeds as I explain dividing according to nature and telling how things stand.*

⁸ Cf. Mouraviev, *Heraclitea* IV. A, p. 53: "F 1a ouvre effectivement le Livre en tant que première affirmation relative au sujet central: le savoir 'sur les dieux et les hommes et l'ordonnance unique de tout'. Et il le fait par le biais du Discours (i. e. λόγος – V. M.) ..."

the new scientific study of the world”.⁹ However, on closer reading of the fragment we do not find anything that relates to the way of knowledge of λόγος from the perspective of Heraclitus. True, he discusses the inability of people to understand (ἀξύνετοι) and to express (ἀπείροισιν εἰκόσι πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων). Still it does not say how he himself came to the knowledge of λόγος, but only how he explains λόγος to those who do not understand.¹⁰

There is a similar case in Fr. B 51¹¹ wherein the internal structure (φύσις) of individual objects is explained by separating out their components, such as opposing forces. Even here Heraclitus does not discuss how he came to that realization but simply explains what has already come to know.

However, there are fragments (besides the first four mentioned) where Heraclitus directly discusses his experiential knowledge acquisition. For example, in Fr. B 55 he seems to favor sensual knowledge: ὄσων ὄψις ἀκοή μάθησις, ταῦτα ἐγὼ προτιμέω.¹² The fragment is usually taken to be authentic,¹³ but interpretations and translations can be different, sometimes even yielding diametrically opposite messages.

Based on the different understanding of the keyword in the fragment – μάθησις – some believe that Heraclitus is being an open sensualist here (Marcovich, Conche),¹⁴ while others see him as a type of empiricist (Kahn),¹⁵ or make a simple effort to neutralize traces of sensualism in the fragment (Diano).¹⁶ Nonetheless,

⁹ Kahn, 1979, p. 100.

¹⁰ The keyword here, διηγέυμαι, is usually and correctly translated in terms of explanation: *I explain* (Kirk, Marcovich), *moi je les expose* (Conche), *I set forth* (Kahn), and in Mouraviev: *j'énonce, I explain, uzlagao*.

¹¹ In English translation by Kirk (Kirk -Raven): *They do not apprehend how being at variance is agrees with itself: there is a back-stretched connexion, as in the bow and the lyre.*

¹² In English translation by Mouraviev (= F 55): *Whatever lendeth itself to seeing, hearing, learning, this do I prefer.*

¹³ The source is Hippolytus, *Refut.* IX, 9. 5.

¹⁴ The translation of the fragment in Marcovich (= fr. 5): *The things of which is seeing, hearing, and perception, these do I prefer.* Conche (= fr. 74) translates: *Ce dont il y a vue, ouïe, perception, c'est cela que, moi, je préfère.*

¹⁵ Kahn (= fr. 14) translated: *Whatever comes from sight, hearing, learning from experience: this I prefer.*

¹⁶ Diano, 1980, (according to Mouraviev, *Heraclitea*, III.3.B/iii) translates: *Pui che alle cose di cui vi è audizione e visione et che si possono apprendere, a queste io dò pregio.* Mouraviev has translated it in French: *J'accorde plus de prix à ces choses-là qu'aux choses qu'on peut entendre et voir et apprendre.*

Mouraviev still cites four different possible interpretations of what was written in fr. B 55.¹⁷

This diversity is not only due to terminological imprecision or even ambivalence contained in fr. B 55, but rather in the attempts of the interpreters to comply with the fragments in which it seems that Heraclitus open marginalize the value of the sensual knowledge.

Namely, fr. B 107 reads: κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὠτα βαρβάρους ψυχᾶς ἐχόντων.¹⁸ The emphasis in the interpretation here is not in the senses (eyes and ears) but rather in the "barbaric soul." Guthrie believes that the barbaric souls are those who "understand not the language."¹⁹ Kahn also follows him in this respect²⁰, which also relies on the etymology of the word,²¹ although it remains unclear whose and what type of language of the soul Heraclitus had in mind. Mouraviev believes that "Heraclitus is not critical of the eyes and ears as poor witnesses of truth, but rather that some souls are poor judges of their testimony."²² Conche is more precise and explains that "âmes barbares, c'est-à-dire... privées elles-mêmes de raison (λόγος)."²³

Regardless of the differences in the details, one thing remains beyond discussion: fr. B 107 marginalizes the value of sensual knowledge by shifting the focus of that which takes places in the soul. It opens up space for the claim that the criterion of truth should be sought in the soul.

Fragments B 34 and B 19 also speak of sensory perception. First they suggest hearing, and then speech. Fr. B 34 states: ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν εἰκόασιν· φάτις αὐτοῖσιν μαρτυρεῖ παρόντας ἀπειναι.²⁴

¹⁷ Mouraviev, *Heraclitea*, III.3.B/iii (= fr. 55), p. 65.

¹⁸ In English translation by Mouraviev (= F 107): *Bad witnesses to men are the eyes and the ears of those whose souls are barbarian.*

¹⁹ *Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men if they have souls that understand not the language* (Guthrie 1977, p. 415).

²⁰ *Eyes and ears are poor witnesses for men if their souls do not understand the language* (Kahn = fr. 16).

²¹ Cf. Liddell-Scott-Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford 1968, ap. βάρβαροι and Herodotus, I, 58.

²² Mouraviev, *Heraclitea*, III.3.B/iii, p. 127.

²³ Conche (= fr. 75), p. 266.

²⁴ In English translation by Mouraviev (= F 34): *Stupid men! When they listen they look like deaf and dumb. The saying witnesseth against them: "Though here, they're far away".*

Contrary to widespread opinion that ἀξύνετοι should be translated as stupid,²⁵ our conviction is that there are no grounds for such a sharp and derogatory word, especially in view of its use at the beginning of fr. B 1 when it is claimed that people are ἀξύνετοι i. e. do not understand λόγος neither before hearing nor after having heard already. That does not mean that people are stupid but rather that λόγος is difficult to understand. Therefore, it is important that after fr. B 1 and fr. B 107 (ὠττα), in fr. B 34 for the third time, it highlights that sound (hearing) as a medium for knowledge is not sufficient for true knowledge on its own.

In fr. B 19 we come across hearing for the fourth time: ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι οὐδ' εἰπεῖν.²⁶ In the absence of a clear context it is difficult to accurately determine the message of that statement. It refers to the relationship with fr. B 1.²⁷ In this case the most important thing is that it is referring to a special listening skill. Heraclitus states that man should know how to listen in order to understand λόγος. Therefore, it is not about listening on an elementary, sensory level, but rather a special form of listening, the art of listening that allows us to “hear” that which we are unable to understand if we are unprepared. If stay within the context of the statement in fr. B 1,²⁸ we can add that λόγος opens before us as long as we know how to listen. Finally, listening becomes a metaphor, turning into a (technical) philosophical term referring to the experience of extrasensory knowledge.

There is another group of three fragments that speak to the value of sensual, subject knowledge. On the one hand, in fr. B 35 it appears that Heraclitus gives some special significance to the subject knowledge: χρῆ γὰρ εἶ μάλα πολλῶν ἱστορας φιλοσόφους ἀνδρας εἶναι.²⁹ It seems that this view contradicts the Heraclitean criticism of sensual knowledge that is addressed on individual terms. However, this is a problematic use of φιλοσόφους (*men who love wisdom, such as philosophers*) since Clement uses

²⁵ Cf. *fools* = Burnet (p. 133) and Guthrie (p. 412), *stolti* = Walzer (p. 74), *les obtus, stupid men* = Mouraviev (p. 93, in *Heraclitea*, III.3.B/i).

²⁶ Usually, ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι is translated as *unable to listen* (eg. Mouraviev, *Heraclitea* III.3.B / i: *incapables d'écouter*). It could mean that they are literally deaf, although it is clearly stated that people *do not know* (οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι) how to listen. *Listening* is some knowledge, skill, some special “listening.”

²⁷ Cf. Marcovich, 1967, p. 10.

²⁸ Cf. Mitevski, 1994.

²⁹ Clem. *Strom.* V, 140, 4. Kahn (= 9) has translated: *Men who love wisdom must be good inquirers into many things indeed.*

the phrase, but it is unlikely that Heraclitus himself used it.³⁰ In the absence of the proven use of φιλόσοφοι, the whole sentence loses its semantic weight.

A contrast to this undifferentiated state can be found in fr. B 40: πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει,³¹ from which follows “*otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus*”. There is no need to get into a detailed analysis; the obvious irony of the second part of the fragment clearly discusses the distrust in the knowledge gained from studying so many different things.³² In fr. B 129 the example of Pythagoras stands out because it accurately reflects the thought of Heraclitus by criticizing the πολυμαθίη: *Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, practised scientific inquiry (ιστορίην ἥσκησεν) beyond all men and having made chosen these writings made his own sapientness, his muchlearnedness, his wickedcraftiness (σοφίην πολυμαθίην κακοτεχνίην)*.³³ Undoubtedly, πολυμαθίη (*muchlearnedness*) is something that opposes knowledge of one thing. In fr. B 41 we read that the wisdom is one (ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τῷ σοφόν): *to know the thought by which all things are steered through all*.

In fr. B 50 Heraclitus definitely discovers how one comes to ἐν τῷ σοφόν: οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἐν πάντα εἶναι.³⁴ The bizarre juxtaposition of λόγου – ἐμοῦ in the phrase οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας is a source of different interpretations. How can one listen to λόγος (*speech*) without listening to the person who is speaking?

In order to avoid arbitrary assumptions, it is necessary to clearly determine the meaning of λόγου³⁵ and ἐμοῦ in relation to one another. The verb ἀκούω (*I hear*) which applies equally to

³⁰ I agree with Marcovich, p. 26-27 although Mouraviev (*Heraclitea* III.3.B/iii, pp. 44-45) is loathe to accept φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα based on “un rythme syllabotonique normal (X o o X o o X o o X o)” in the line 2.

³¹ In English translation by Mouraviev (= F 40): *Muchlearnedness teacheth not intelligence...*

³² The key word, πολυμαθίη, Mouraviev (= F 40) has translated: *muchlearnedness, multiscience, многоученость*; Marcovich (= fr. 16): *learning of many things*; Guthrie and after him Kahn (= fr. 18): *much learning*.

³³ My translation of this fragment is based on Mouraviev’s.

³⁴ Reading εἶναι seems to me more likely than εἰδέναι in *cod. Par.* In English translation by Mouraviev (= F 50b): *After listening not to me, but to the logos, <it is right>to agree that wise (wisdom) is: knowing all things <to be>one.*

³⁵ Here I accept the soundly grounded and widely accepted (Kirk, Marcovich, Mouraviev) emendation of Bernays who replaces δόγματος in the manuscript *cod. Par.* with the much more likely λόγου (Bernays, J. “Neue Bruchstücke des Heraklit von Efesus”, *RhM* 9(1854)258–9).

both words plays a key role here. Its meaning is not problematic in terms of ἐμοῦ because a person who speaks can be heard. Disparities arise when one needs to explain how a person can listen to itself λόγος. There are two possibilities: listening to grasp metaphorically or to once again accept the personification of the Logos regardless of the speaker.

Burnet³⁶ interprets ἀκούσαντας in its everyday meaning, but λόγος still as a teaching of Heraclitus. As such, λόγος which binds itself to ἐμου bears something personal of Heraclitus, but λόγος should be heard regardless of the speaker's prophecy, free from the personal and subjective of the philosopher. Ramnoux³⁷ develops a similar argument and concludes that the teacher and the Logos are not the same.

Marcovich³⁸ believes that listening to the Logos should be understood metaphorically and that the Logos should be personified, but that sort of solution is impossible because one excludes the other: if listening to the Logos is metaphorical there is no need for personification and, if the Logos is personified there is no need for metaphorical listening. Kirk,³⁹ from whose interpretation Marcovich draws, believes that listening to the Logos should be understood metaphorically, in terms of submission (ἀκούσαντας might simply imply 'obey') while the Logos is personified "to some extent" ("some degree of personification is implied"). Of course, it is impossible to accurately determine the "degree of personification".

The least that can be drawn as a conclusion from this debate is first that Heraclitus suggests that λόγος is some form of speech, principle or learning that can be heard regardless (or in the absence of) the speaker (Heraclitus). Second, hearing in the absence of the speaker can no longer be at the sensory level as the sense of hearing is pointless when the message is nonverbal, but must be some non-sensory communication that takes place on another level, beyond the sensory field. Those who "hear" the Logos in this way remain alone, without an external interlocutor. Third, if we bear in mind that directly "hearing" the Logos leads to the realization that *all is one* (ἐν πάντα εἶναι), then the *one* is no longer one among many other things, but *one* that unites all, an abstract *one* (τὸ ἐν), which ultimately means that it is non-objective. Consequently, this sort of knowledge is not only non-sensory and non-verbal, but it is also non-objective.

³⁶ Burnet, 1930, p. 133.

³⁷ Ramnoux, 1959, p. 146-148.

³⁸ Marcovich (= fr. 26), p. 114.

³⁹ Kirk, 1961, p. 67.

Heraclitus seems to address the question of where and how this non-sensory and non-objective knowledge takes place in fr. B 101 when he says: ἐδιζήσαμην ἑμεωυτόν. This short phrase is how one might refer to a special form of knowledge, or perhaps it could be called self-knowledge. We say this provisionally because there are many obstacles in the way of this sort of understanding. The saying is largely enigmatic and leaves room for various interpretations, and besides that there is no immediate context upon which we could rely for any meaningful clarification. That is why the resulting translations do not always yield the same messages. For example, Zeller⁴⁰ translates *er will nicht andere befragen, sondern sich selbst*, Diels⁴¹: *Ich durchforschte mich selbst*, Fränkel⁴²: *Ich habe mich selbst gesucht*, Burnet,⁴³ Kirk⁴⁴ and Guthrie⁴⁵: *I searched myself*, and so on.

The ancient authors who cite this fragment generally puts it in relation to the Delphic saying γνῶθι σαυτόν (*know thyself*). Plutarch,⁴⁶ our primary source for fr. B 101, is the first who upon reading the fragment related it to the famous γνῶθι σαυτόν, and in that respect Iulianus⁴⁷ also follows. Plotinus⁴⁸ for his part gives no clear explanatory comment on the aforementioned fragment, and from the fragment, Tatian⁴⁹ comes to the conclusion that Heraclitus was an autodidact.

Among modern interpreters, Kahn accepts the dominant ancient interpretation of the fragment, but believes that in Heraclitus we have a “modern reading of the Delphic γνῶθι σαυτόν: self-knowledge is difficult because a man is divided from himself”. According to that, “we are close here” to “the Christian idea that a person may be alienated from his own (true) self”.⁵⁰

Conche rejects the link with the Delphic saying, and ἐδιζήσαμην ἑμεωυτόν in fr. B 101 interprets as follows: “‘Je me suis cherché moi-même’, dit le Philosophe; entendons: je me suis désaliéné, désengagé, j’ai ‘déconstruit’ l’individu de groupe que

⁴⁰ Zeller, 1920, p. 904.

⁴¹ Diels, 1956, p. 173.

⁴² Fränkel, 1976, p. 432.

⁴³ Burnet, 1930, p. 139.

⁴⁴ Kirk/Raven, 1962, p.

⁴⁵ Guthrie, 1962, p. 414.

⁴⁶ Plut. *Adu. Col.* 20, 118 c.

⁴⁷ Iul. *Orat.* VI (IX).

⁴⁸ Plot. V, 9[5] 5, 31.

⁴⁹ Tatian. *Or. ad Gr.* 3.

⁵⁰ Kahn, 1979, (= fr. 28) p. 116.

j'étais, j'ai rompu intimement avec la loi du groupe (...) pour avoir la vue et le jugement libres."⁵¹

The interpretations of Kahn and Conche are interesting in themselves, but have no immediate support in Heraclitus. With their free associations, at the very least they suffer from anachronism.

Verdenius focuses exclusively on fr. B 101 and comes to the conclusion that the philosopher “prides himself on drawing only on his own insight”,⁵² but it is unlikely for Heraclitus whose sayings regularly contain deep messages, not just naked praise.

Marcovich calls seriously into question the traditional relationship of fr. B 101 with the Delphic saying warning that “neither δίζησθαι means the same as γινώσκειν, nor ἐμεωυτόν as ψυχή”.⁵³ In my opinion, the argumentation is much stronger in the first part of Marcovich’s statement.

Mouraviev likewise points out that the absence of context in the fragment itself provides that opportunity for both words⁵⁴ to be interpreted in different ways. Based on a grammatical analysis of the saying, he concludes that there can be three different meanings, and by extension different translations of the fragment: ἐμεωυτόν peut être un accusatif de l’objet direct (*J’ai cherché moi*), un accusatif de l’objet interne (*J’ai cherché de moi-même, j’ai fait ma propre recherche*), un accusatif de spécification (*J’ai cherché s’agissant de moi*)”. In another place, Mouraviev favors the second translation (*J’ai cherché de moi-même, j’ai fait ma propre recherche*) which he acknowledges is the most banal according to its meaning, but that is also supported by a number of secondary sources.⁵⁵ In addition, he suggests that in aorist (ἐδίξασα) should mean that it is talking about a search that has already been completed. Although Mouraviev opens new areas of deep analysis Heraclitean sayings, he also leaves the matter unresolved with opportunities for simultaneous interpretations. As for the aorist, that which the research shows as finished does not mean that it has not occurred over a longer period.

⁵¹ Conche, 1986, (= fr. 61) p. 231.

⁵² Verdenius, 1947, p. 281.

⁵³ Marcovich, 1967, (= fr. 15), p. 57.

⁵⁴ Mouraviev (in *Heraclitea* III.3.B/i: *Recensio, Fragmenta* = F 101, p. 253) points out that in antiquity there are three different readings to the keyword: ἐδίξασα, ἐδίξασα and ἐδίδαξα (so given by various authors). Likewise, besides ἐμεωυτόν we also encounter the forms ἐμωυτόν and ἐμαυτόν, but they do not have an essential different meanings in relation to the message of the fragment.

⁵⁵ Mouraviev, *Heraclitea* IV. A: *Refectio*, p. 84.

In an analysis of fr. B 101, Guthrie stresses his conviction that “Heraclitus was certainly ‘looking for himself’ in the sense that he was trying to discover his own true nature”.⁵⁶ He explores the meaning of the keyword ἐδιζήσάμην in Homer, Theognis and Herodotus, and links it with the saying of the Delphic oracle. From there he also addresses the second word ἐμεωυτόν and concludes: “Thus by the two words of fr. 101 Heraclitus meant, I suggest, first, ‘I turned my thoughts within and sought to discover my real self’; secondly, ‘I asked questions of myself’; thirdly, ‘I treated the answers like Delphic responses hinting, in a riddling way, at the single truth behind them, and I tried to discover the real meaning of my selfhood; for I knew that if I understood myself I would have grasped the *logos* which is the real constitution of everything else as well”.⁵⁷ The author maintains that this is Heraclitus’ philosophical method of self-search, based on intuition rather than on observation and analysis of data.⁵⁸

In Guthrie’s lucid analysis, however, one can note it relies solely on exploring, as the author himself recognizes, “two words” of the isolated fr. B 101. Therefore, the conclusions given, although they are inspiring, remain on the level of suppositions. They do not have unequivocal support in Heraclitus. In addition, it remains unclear what exactly the words “real self” or “self-hood” would mean. They do not clarify much with respect to the original ἐμεωυτόν, and moreover unnecessarily open up new issues and dilemmas. Furthermore, Logos as the ultimate object of ἐδιζήσάμην is acceptable given the Heraclitean doctrine of Logos in general, but there is lacking a closer argumentation in this regard. The suggestion that Heraclitus here talks about intuition as his personal philosophical method deserves special attention, but the term itself is burdened with anachronism.

In the absence of clear internal context of the phrase in fr. B 101, the external may be of greater interpretive assistance (despite etymology and other methods), confirming a wider meaningful context that is revealed in comparison with other fragments whose message seems to be similar. Certainly that is a well-known and established comparative method. However, it is sometimes neglected or used negligently. What is needed is careful, step by step, and incremental hermeneutical progress rather than bold generalizations. It seems that the keys to the interpretive context of fr. B 101 are directly or indirectly the fragments of group B (according to Diels): 116, 45, 115, 114.

⁵⁶ Guthrie, 1962, p. 418.

⁵⁷ Op. cit., p. 419.

⁵⁸ Op. cit., p. 419.

At first glance, fr. B 116 (ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι μέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑαυτοῦς καὶ σωφρονεῖν)⁵⁹ gives the impression that is thematically closest to fr. B 101, which is why they are often interpreted together. It is discouraging that this saying, whose only source is Stobaeus,⁶⁰ is of dubious authenticity for many distinguished researchers.⁶¹ But, as Mouraviev wittily concludes,⁶² “les soupçons (...) ne sont que de soupçons” and adds that those doubts are not based on any convincing argument.

In contrast to self-searching (ἐδιζήσάμην ἑμεωυτόν) in fr. B 101, here Heraclitus clearly discusses self-knowledge (γινώσκειν ἑαυτοῦς) that formally approaches the Delphic γνώθισαυτόν. However, the claim made that *it belongs to all men to know themselves* does not favor that interpretation. It is unlikely that Heraclitus would claim that every person has the power for self-knowledge, especially if we keep in mind the initial statement of fr. B 1 (*men ever fail to comprehend, both before hearing it and once they have heard...*). Thus it is more likely that the meaning of the phrase is that others besides Heraclitus can achieve self-knowledge and not as a divine revelation (Delphic prophetism) but as a result of individual efforts that are inherent to specific individuals. This meaning further points to the final part of fr. B 116: σωφρονεῖν (*be of sound mind*).⁶³

The very notion of self-knowledge in Heraclitus is ambiguous if we confine ourselves to fr. B 101 and fr. B 116. We can get closer to answering the question of self-knowledge in Heraclitus by turning to fr. B 45. The questions to which we expect an answer are: What is the object of self-knowledge? Where does that process take place in humans? And how does self-knowledge take place?

⁵⁹ In English translated by Mouraviev (= F 116): *It pertaineth to all men to know themselves and to think soundly.*

⁶⁰ Stob. III, 5, 6.

⁶¹ Cf.: Gigon, p. 16; Kirk, p. 390; Guthrie, p. 417, n. 2; Marcovich (= fr. 23 e), p. 90. Aliter: Kahn (= fr. 29); Conche (= fr. 60), p. 227-228; Mouraviev, *Heraclitea*, III.3.B/iii, p.136.

⁶² Mouraviev, *Heraclitea*, III.3.B/iii, *loc. cit.*

⁶³ Cf.: Kahn (= fr. 29), p. 116-117: “self-knowledge, like understanding the *logos*, belongs to all men by right. But in fact precious few will achieve it”; Conche (= fr. 60), p. 227: “Se connaître soi-même signifie se connaître comme ayant ce privilège...”. Aliter: Mouraviev (*Heraclitea* IV.A: *Refectio*, = fr. 103) p. 102: “γινώσκειν ἑαυτοῦς renvoie naturellement à F 101 – voire au γνώθισαυτόν delphique – et doit donc être compris, lui aussi, dans un sens ‘autonomiste’: non pas ‘se connaître soi-même introspectivement’ (sens réfléchi), mais ‘connaître (absol. = accéder au savoir) indépendamment d’autrui’, au moyen de sa propre faculté cognitive (ἑαυτοῦς: accusatif de ‘l’objet interne’ avec ellipse et qualificatif limitatif)”.

At first glance, it seems fr. B 45 can not offer anything special in terms of the established issues. It reads: καὶ ψυχῆς πειρατὰ ἰῶν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο, πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν. οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει (*You will not find out the limits of the soul when you go, travelling on every road, so deep a Logos does it have*). In fact, the fragment as a whole produces many dilemmas. Its authenticity is partially thrown into question, especially in the final part referring to the Logos.⁶⁴ On the other hand, if we accept the authenticity of this part (and my opinion is that we should because it gives meaning to the entire sentence that would otherwise be unclear and vague), the question then centers on what the Logos is signifying. Translations of Logos in this case into modern languages are numerous and quite different: *Grund* (Diels), *Sinn* (Kranz), *measure* (Gigon, Burnet, Kirk), *discours* (Conche). Marcovich states that “its meaning here is not certain”, but nonetheless translates it to *measure*.⁶⁵ Mouraviev offers still other semantic (and translating) versions of Logos in this fragment: *logos* (in English), *parole* (in French), and in Russian: *логос, глагол* and *речение*.⁶⁶ However, without needing to get too deep into a semantic analysis of Logos in fr. B 45, the minimum acceptable position is that Logos in this fragment cannot be substantially different from that in fr. B 1 and fr. B 50 which has meaning for the general principle, law or simply its verbal expression.⁶⁷

Of significance for this research is that from fr. B 45 it emerges that the soul has Logos and that the Logos is (deep) in the soul. The dilemma of whether or not it is referring to a cosmic phenomenon⁶⁸ or to the human soul has no special meaning here if we accept the view that the human soul is part of the cosmic soul, which is widely supported in Heraclitus.⁶⁹ In fr. B 115 we find additional support that the soul has Logos, but that calls upon a very important semantic extension: ψυχῆς ἐστὶ λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὐξῶν (*soul has a logos increasing itself*).

It must be stated that its authenticity is problematic, as is the case for many of the Heraclitean fragments. In this case it is problematic that Stobaeus, the only ancient source, attributes the

⁶⁴ The final part, οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει, Bywater rejects as unauthentic, Ramnoux is reserved on the matter, but others (Diels, Burnet, Marcovich, Conche) mostly adopt the conclusion which was previously stated.

⁶⁵ Marcovich, 1967 p. 367.

⁶⁶ In *Heraclitus, Fragmenta*, fr. 45; in *Гераклит Эфесский*, фр. 45 and in *Реконструкция*, фр. 209.

⁶⁷ Cf. Mitevski, 1994 and Митевски, 1997, pp. 55–78.

⁶⁸ Recently, Betegh, 2013 has insisted on the cosmic aspect.

⁶⁹ Cf. Митевски, 1997, pp. 100–106.

fragment to Socrates and not to Heraclitus. It may seem shocking, but there are reasons why many researchers believe that they are in fact the words of Heraclitus.

Bywater⁷⁰ is one of the first commentators to deny the authenticity of the fragment, and Diano came to the same opinion even more recently.⁷¹ Marcovich also displays certain doubts concerning its authenticity,⁷² while Kahn despite those doubts⁷³ points to “the reference to the *logos* of soul” in fr. B 45 and also adds that “the notion that the *psychē* grows or feeds itself with the body is attested in Hippocratic writings”. To the end, he concludes that “it is just possible that CI⁷⁴ is after all a quotation from Heraclitus”.⁷⁵ In fact, with the reference to Hippocrates (*de victu* I, 6), Hense, Schenkl and Diels long ago attributed this saying to Heraclitus, but more recently Conche has accepted this fragment as authentic by reference to the Pindarus,⁷⁶ citing simultaneously the Logos of the soul in fr. B 45.⁷⁷

One should not dismiss the possibility that some of the ancient sources simply made a mistake as is probably the case in fr. B 115 because in Stobaeus the fragment directly builds upon a series of seven listed Heraclitean fragments. Moreover, the content of the message in fr. B 115 is completely foreign to the restrained manner of the historical Socrates towards each apodictically stated position, especially regarding the nature of the soul.⁷⁸ At the same time, that message very easily fits into a series of Heraclitean sayings about the soul, especially with the message in fr. B 45. Those are

⁷⁰ Bywater, 1892.

⁷¹ Diano, 1980.

⁷² Marcovich, 1967, (p. 569) argues: “I think that the saying might be spurious: (i) because it is transmitted under the name of Socrates; (ii) because of the similarity between this fragment and such instances as: Plotin. VI,5 [23]. 9, 13”, Plutarchus, (*de an. procr.* 1012 d), Aristotle (*de anima* a 2) and others; (iii) the measure (this is Marcovich’s translation of λόγος – V.M.) seems to imply something *constant* in Heraclitus’ Physics...”

⁷³ Kahn, 1979 (p. 237) argues that “the language is not distinctive enough to guarantee authenticity; and the textual attestation is weak.”

⁷⁴ Fr. CI in Kahn = fr. B 115 D/K.

⁷⁵ Kahn, 1979, p. 237.

⁷⁶ Cf. Conche, 1986, p. 354: “il est évident: au *logos* que ‘la divinité fait croître’ (αὔξει λόγον, *Néméenne*, 32) s’oppose le *logos* qui s’accroît lui-même”.

⁷⁷ Conche, *ibid.*

⁷⁸ According to Plato’s *Apology*, Socrates says: “For the state of death is one of two things: either it is virtually nothingness, so that the dead has no consciousness of anything, or it is, as people say, a change and migration of the soul from this to another places”. (English translation is given according edition of Plato in The Loeb Classical Library, London-Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960).

the arguments upon which fr. B 115 is accepted as authentic, in accordance to a brief and well-reasoned argumentation of S. Mouraviev.⁷⁹

There is no reason to think that the Logos here is not the same one from fr. B 45, fr. B 101, fr. B 50 or fr. B 1. It is problematic, however, as it is now *increasing itself* (ἐαυτὸν αὐξῶν).

Kahn⁸⁰ claims “that the self-augmenting power of the psyche is part of what is meant by the ‘deep *logos*’ of the soul in XXX (D.45)”, and “that this power of self-expansion is manifested in the exhalation or ‘boiling up’ of heated vapour” (according his commentary of fr. B 36 – V. M.). He goes on to add that “Heraclitus would thus conceive the psyche as Homer conceived wrath, ‘which increases like smoke within the breasts of men’ (*Iliad* XVIII. 110)”. The link to Homer is a distraction that goes beyond the context of the Heraclitean fragments, but the reference to fr. B 45 deserves attention.

Ramnoux⁸¹ first points to Pindar (*Nemeia* VII 32) who sings that God makes the Logos grow in man, and concludes that unlike Pindar whom *logos de l’homme* se oppose au *logos des dieux*, in Heraclitus *logos de l’homme* s’oppose à *l’idole de l’homme*. The problem is that due to the juxtaposition in the second case, the growth of the Logos loses its meaning. Likewise, starting from Pindar who sings about the Logos that grows in the victors with the help of God, Conche⁸² suggests that the Heraclitean Logos from fr. B 115 does not need help from God or poets because it is nourished by the fire within the soul. Unlike that acceptable starting point, Conche’s further generalizations are stand alone excerpts.

My position is that in discussing Logos as increasing itself (fr. B 115) we do not need to stay far from fr. B 45 and fr. B 101 as the source of Heraclitean context. Illuminating aspect seems to be also the comparison with fr. B 114, which directly precedes Stobaeus’ list of Heraclitean fragments in fr. B 115. The substantial fr. B 114 translated into English⁸³ with my quotations in Greek (with small letters in bracket) states: *Those who speak with intelligence (ΞΥΝ ΝΟΩΙ) must firmly rely on the common (ΞΥΝΩΙ) like a city on the law, and a city [even] more. For all human laws*

⁷⁹ Mouraviev, 2006, (*Heraclitea*, III.3 B/iii: *Recensio: Fragmenta*), p. 136.

⁸⁰ Kahn, 1979, p. 237.

⁸¹ Ramnoux, 1959, pp. 116–118.

⁸² Conche, 1986, pp. 354–355.

⁸³ I suggest here Mouraviev’ expressive English translation (*Heraclitea* III.3. B/i), p. 291.

are nourished by the one divine (τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ). *For it ruleth as much as it liketh, suffices for all and runneth not out.*

Of particular interest in this study is to first determine the meaning of νόμοι (laws). In a wide semantic plan, Reinhardt's position is acceptable that ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι there can be a more general meaning to the laws of the country.⁸⁴ But, what can νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ mean? Kirk's interpretation is inspirational, suggesting that "for Heraclitus θεῖος meant nothing more than 'permanent' or 'universal'", concluding that "at the same time it can be maintained that by θεῖος he meant more or less the same as is meant by the Logos of fr. 1, the ξυνόν or θεῖος νόμος of this fragment."⁸⁵

Furthermore, Kirk believes that "nourishing of the human laws" can be taken in a metaphorical sense,⁸⁶ but he does not give any more precision of this metaphore. Restraint in this regard is justified given that any attempt at defining more precisely can be a shot in the dark. However, the minimum that can be drawn is that the feeding metaphor suggests some sort of dependent relationship: *all human laws are nourished by the one divine* = *all human laws (human logoi) depend on the one divine (logos)*. An attempt to link things might look like this. (1) When fr. B 114 states that human law feeds from divine, universal rules, it could mean that the Logos in man is dependent on the Logos as cosmic law. (2) Feeding off of the cosmic Logos, the Logos in man grows and increases (fr. B 115). (3) The growth of the Logos as a principle of knowledge in the broadest sense of the word cannot mean anything other than the growth of knowledge itself. (4) Given that the process of feeding with respect to the cognitive growth of the Logos takes place in man's soul, that advancement of knowledge is a process of self-recognition.

* * *

At the end of this analysis we can offer a response to the problem posed earlier regarding the meaning of the group fragments (fr.: B 101, B 116, B 45, and B 115) that suggest a special form of knowledge in Heraclitus. The cognitive elements are as follows: the Logos is an object of cognition, and the soul is a medium in which the object (Logos) and subject (Logos) of cognition are the same. So, Logos in the soul recognizes and acknowledges itself. Heraclitus expressed this whole procedure in his own way in fr. B 101 – ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν (*I searched myself*).

⁸⁴ Reinhardt, 1977, p. 215.

⁸⁵ Kirik, 1961, p. 54.

⁸⁶ Op. cit., p. 51

This unusual Heraclitic self-cognition contains several essential features that stand out from the ordinary ranks of objective knowledge.

1. It is non-verbal knowledge. The philosopher discusses listening to the Logos a few times (fr.: B 1, B 107, B 34, B 50 and B 19), which does exclude verbal communication because it takes place in the absence of a speaker (fr. B 50). Listening is transferred to the interior world of one who should “eavesdrop on” what the Logos is saying in the soul.

2. It is non-sensory knowledge. Contrary to sensory knowledge that is useless if it touches the “barbaric soul” (fr. B 107), the “non-barbaric soul” is a medium in which knowledge takes place independently of the senses. Soul is the criterion of truth independent of the sensory world.

3. It is non-objective knowledge. The purpose of knowledge is not the world of sensory objects but rather the Logos as one. However, the Logos is not an object among the other objects but is separate abstract unity (fr. B 50).

4. It is self-recognition of the Logos in the soul. Basically, the Logos that is an expression of human self-awareness recognizes itself in the soul. Thanks to the equivalence of the Logos in the world and the Logos in the soul of a conscious person, the knowledge of the world is compacted into the self-knowledge of the Logos. Stated differently, the Logos who thinks can think of itself, and that is a recognized idea in ancient philosophy. When Guthrie discusses the intuitive character of the Heraclitean form of self-knowledge, it is probably close to what Heraclitus had in mind when he uttered the words recorded as fr. B 101: *I searched myself*. However, it was said that such an interpretation remains at the level of an anachronism because intuitive knowledge only partially covers the essence of the message of fr. B 101. Much closer to the Heraclitean intention is the original Greek word θεωρία (*theōria* or *contemplation* as it is usually and not exactly translated in English)⁸⁷ that would later come to view self-knowledge as the highest form of knowledge.

In fact, Heraclitus finds himself at the beginning of the developmental line of the ancient philosophical notion of *theōria* meaning self-knowledge. We can find a later form of that notion in Parmenides, in fr. B 3 (D/K):⁸⁸ τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι (*for it is the same thing that can be thought and can be*).⁸⁹

⁸⁷ In Macedonian and some other Slavic languages, it is exactly translated with *созерцание* (*sozercanie*), according to more than one Millennium Old Slavic tradition of translation of θεωρία.

⁸⁸ This is quotation from Clem. *Strom.* VI, 23.

⁸⁹ Translated by W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. II, Cambridge, 1978; p. 14.

It seems that Plato had a similar cognitive experience with the soul when he says: Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῆ, ἐκεῖ-
σε οἶχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον... (*But
when the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs into realm of the
pure, the everlasting...*).⁹¹

Perhaps we are closest to the Heraclitean notion of *theōria* in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*⁹² when he discusses the mental activity of God: αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς, κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοετοῦ. D. Ross comments thusly: “The object of his knowledge is therefore Himself. ‘Now mind knows itself by participation in the known; it becomes known by touching and knowing, so that the same thing is mind and object of mind’”⁹³

However, if the Heraclitean notion of self-knowledge is indeed the spark for the later philosophical notion of *theōria*, that is a problem that requires further and extensive comparative research.

REFERENCES

- Betegh, G., 2013, “On the physical aspect of Heraclitus’ psychology: With New Appendices”, *Doctrine and Doxography. Studies on Heraclitus and Pythagoras*. Eds. D. Sider and D. Obbink, Berlin/Boston.
- Burnet J., 1930, *Early Greek Philosophy*, London.
- Bywater I., 1892 (1970) *Heracliti Ephesii reliquiae*, Oxonii.
- Conche M., 1986, *Héraclite, Fragments*, Paris.
- Diano C.–Serra G., 1980, *Eraclito. I frammenti e le testimonianze*, testo e traduzione di C. D., commento di C. D. e G. S., Milano.
- Diels H., 1956, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* I, 6, verbesserte Auflage hrsg. von W. Kranz. Berlin.
- Fränkel H., 1976, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums*, München.
- Gigon, O., 1935, *Untersuchungen zu Heraklit*. Leipzig.
- Guthrie W. K. C., 1977, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. I: *The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans*, Cambridge.
- Kahn Ch., 1979, *The art and thought of Heraclitus. An edition of the fragments with translation and commentary*, Cambridge.
- Kirk G. S., 1961, *Heraclitus. The cosmic fragments*, Cambridge.

⁹⁰ Plato, *Phaedo* 79 c-d.

⁹¹ Translated according H. N. Fowler, *Plato with an English translation*, The Loeb Classical Library, London/Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960; p. 277.

⁹² Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* 1072 b 20.

⁹³ D. Ross, *Aristotle*. London, 1977; p. 182.

- Kirk G. S. – Raven J. E., 1962, *The Presocratic philosophers. A critical history with a selection of texts*, Cambridge.
- Marcovich M., 1967 (2001), *Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary*, Editio maior, Merida.
- Mitevski V., 1994, “Heraclitus’ *logos* as a principle of change”, *Živa antika* 44/1-2, pp. 45–64.
- Митевски В., 1997, *Хераклит*, Скопје (in Macedonian).
- Mouraviev S., 1999–2011 – *Heraclitea. Édition critique complète des témoignages sur la vie et l’oeuvre d’Héraclite d’Éphèse et des vestiges de son livre*, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
- Муравьев С. Н., 2012, *Гераклит Эфесский. Всё наследие*. На языках оригинала и в русском переводе. Краткое издание, Москва: AdMarginem.
- Ramoux C., 1959, *Héraclite ou l’homme entre les choses et les mots*, Paris.
- Reinhardt K., 1977, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*. Frankfurt a/M.
- Verdenius W. J., 1947, “Notes on the Presocratics”, *Mnemosyne* 13, pp. 271–284.
- Vlastos G., 1955, “On Heraclitus”, *American Journal of Philology* vol. 76, pp. 337–368.
- Walzer R., 1964, *Eraclito. Raccolta dei frammenti e traduzione italiana*, Hildesheim, Olms.
- Zeller E., 1920, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, I 2, Leipzig.