HERACLITUS' LOGOS AS A PRINCIPLE OF CHANGE

Abstract: 1. The etymology of λόγος is a necessary assumption, but it is not sufficient to define the particular sense of this word in Heraclitus. 2. Starting from certain of the logos-fragments (especially from fr. 1), λόγος can be understood as a common and everlasting principle which governs all things. 3. The parallel with other "governing principles of all things" (denominated or indicated in frr. 41, 64, 11 and 16) suggests the way in which logos governs. 4. Fr. 32 indicates that Heraclitus deliberately uses different terms to express the same idea. 5. λόγος is just a name for one of the many appearances of ἐν τῷ οὐσίᾳ (fr. 41) as a principle of general unification. 6. The peculiarity of λόγος as a principle of unification appears in its being directed towards φύσις in fr. 1: λόγος unifies all things by governing through their inner change.

1. It is a fact that today there is no one generally accepted opinion of the meaning of logos in Heraclitus, not even one such which could be said to be dominant. Some ascribe to this word a number of different meanings depending on the fragment analysed. Others differentiate the essential meanings of logos in Heraclitus; yet others

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1 For example, M. Marcovich (in Heraclitus, Greek Text with a Short Commentary, Editio maior, Mérida 1967, 8) proposes the following meanings of λόγος: "statement implying (oral) teaching" in frr. 1,108 and 87 (but in fr. 1 he translates λόγος with "Truth"); "objective truth (law, rule)" in frr. 2 and 50 (in the translated fragments λόγος is simply transliterated as "Logos"); "proportion" or "measure" in fr. 31 and "probably" in fr. 45; and "value", "account", "estimation" in fr. 39.

2 "The complexity of the Logos-conception in Heraclitus" is summarized by Guthrie in the following points: 1. "it is first of all the everlasting truth"; 2. "it is the subject of that truth, the One which is everything"; and 3. "this One is at the same time the divine, intelligent principle which surrounds us and causes the ordering of the cosmos, and that within us to which we owe whatever intelligence we possess."; 4. "at the same time it is fire..." (W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy I, Cambridge 1962, 434). Some others interpret the essential meaning of Heraclitus' logos (mainly deduced from frr. 1,2 and 50) as expressing the more condensed: "Word" (as a prophetic word, cf. J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, London 1930, 133 n. 1); "formula of things" (G. S. Kirk, in Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments, Cambridge 1962, 38-39 suggests this phrase as a "basic" sense of λόγος in frr. 1,2,50, but in the translation of the cited fragments in the same work he himself uses "Logos"); "Argumentation" (as "eine besondere Form der Rechenschaftsblage" proposed by W. J. Verdenius in "Der Logosbergiff bei Heraklit und Parmenides", Phronesis 11 (1966) 89).
look for the one and single translation of the word which will encompass all the meanings of the original logos and will reduce them to one³.

One rather desperate answer to this hopeless situation is the attitude according to which it is completely erroneous to reduce logos to anything more than the common meaning of discourse; logos is simply Heraclitus' discourse. Those who seek for more than that (some special meaning) only blur things and are in fact looking for something which is not in Heraclitus⁴.

In a situation like this it is perhaps best to go back to a cautious heuristic definition: logos is a puzzle... But the discursive mind takes us back yet again: what in fact could that word-puzzle have hidden for the Greeks, especially at a time close to that of Heraclitus? Hope turns to the word itself.

The etymology of the word λόγος imposes itself with the seductive offer of its original meaning which, at the same time, should be the basic one. At first we find λόγος in Homer and Hesiod with the meaning of "word", "discourse", "account"⁵... But the original meaning of logos as a verbal noun reveals itself in the verb λέγω to which it corresponds in meaning, and that is: "gather", "pick out", "choose"⁶. Hence the generated meanings: "reckon", "count over", "count", as well as "babble", "discuss", "give an account of", "speak"⁷...

³ C. Ramnoux (Héraclite ou l'homme entre les choses et les mots, Paris 1959, pp. 316–319) maintains that "emplois héraclitéens de Logos se laissent distribuer à partir du sens de la leçon" (317). However while insisting on reconciling the meaning of the French word "la leçon" with λόγος in each particular logos-fragment quoted, throughout the book he prefers, in his translation, the transliterated "Logos". In fact, Ramnoux is content with the statement that "la leçon ne serait pas une mauvaise traduction" (317); while more recently, M. Conche (Héraclite, Fragments, Paris 1986) insists on the translation of λόγος with "Discours": "Le logos est le Discours vérité" (33); in all instances (except fr. 31) he consequently translates λόγος with "Discours", which leads to occasional problems in being convincing. Similary, Ch. Kahn (The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, Cambridge 1979) translates λόγος in English with "account" (frs. 1, 2, 39, 87 and 108) or "report" (frs. 45, 50 and 115), with exception of fr. 31 ("amount").

⁴ M. L. West, an outstanding advocate of this point of view (in Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient, Oxford 1971, 124) distinguishes two reasons for persistence of this inauthentic "Logos-doctrine": "the power of exegetical tradition" and "inadequate recognition of the way in which Ionian writers tend to refer to their discourses as self-activated autonomous beings"; as his precedents West refers to J. Burnet and H. W. J. Surig (in dissertation De betekenis van Logos bij Herakleitos volgens de traditie en de fragmenten, Nijmegen 1951), and as representative of West's viewpoint we would mention J. Barnes (in The Presocratic Philosophers I, London 1982, 59).

⁵ II. 15, 393; Od. 1,56; Theog. 890; Erga 106.

⁶ Cf. P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque, Paris 1968: "λέγω: le sens original est "rassembler, cueillir, choisir"" (II. 23, 239; II. 21, 27).

⁷ Ibid.: "compter, dénombrer" (II. 2, 125), "énumérer" (Od. 11, 374; Od. 12, 165), "bavarder, discouvrir" (II. 23, 275; II. 23, 292), "raconter, dire"...
However, every attempt to determine Heraclitus' understanding of logos taking etymology as an exclusive starting point meets with serious problems. It is, namely, very difficult to determine irrefutably which of the meanings cited is the starting point in Heraclitus' philosophy, as can be seen from the differences in various interpretations\(^8\); furthermore, the very assumption that the original meaning must, in Heraclitus, also be the basic one is also problematic; and finally, the very method of a previous external definition of logos (outside the philosophical context) inevitably leads to its additional and forced implantation into individual fragments\(^9\).

A study guided by the faith that "word and thought go together" emphasises as many as 11 meanings of \(\lambda\omicron\acute{\gamma}o\varsigma\) which could serve as a foundation for Heraclitus' definition of this term\(^10\). It is believed that the philosopher did not entirely abandon its inherited meanings, which is acceptable. However, a direct examination of the logos-fragments will soon show that here the traditional meanings are sporadic in character\(^11\). Already at its very beginning philosophy shows deliberation in its treatment of language: it gives the inherited words particular meanings and adjusts them so that they express the new philosophical thought. What is essential in Heraclitus' \(\lambda\omicron\acute{\gamma}o\varsigma\) goes beyond the region of the commonly known and is defined as special and specific.

2. Turning to Heraclitus' fragments in which logos is mentioned by name is more promising. It is natural to start from what Heraclitus himself said about his logos. From the total number of surviving fragments, nine authentic ones (fragments: 1, 2, 31, 39, 45, 50, 87, 108 and 115) contain logos by name. In fragments 87, 108 and 39 logos is used within its traditional framework of meaning (word, teaching, esteem), so that here we do not find any particular expansion

\(^8\) For example, E. Kurtz (Interpretationen zu den Logos-Fragmenten Heraclitus, Tübingen 1959) starts from "Wort" (like Grundbedeutung) in order to arrive at "Resenschaft"; Verdenius (op. cit.) starts from "Sammlung" and arrives at "Argumentation", while M. Heidegger (Einführung in die Metaphysik, Tübingen 1953) takes "Sammlung" as having its original sense, and as essential in Heraclitus.

\(^9\) This is precisely what occurs in the authors mentioned in footnote 8. However, Heidegger's approach finds a certain justification in the fact that Heraclitus' logos serves him as a foundation on which he builds his own viewpoint. On the other hand, Verdenius builds an abstract scheme of meanings (Schema der Bedeutungsentfaltung) which, while it may be a good starting point for a study, is not sufficient to encompass the new and specific meaning which Heraclitus ascribes to his \(\lambda\omicron\acute{\gamma}o\varsigma\).

\(^10\) Guthrie, pp. 419–424.

\(^11\) R. A. Prier (Archaic Logic: Symbol and Structure in Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles, The Hague – Paris, 1976, 58) is right when he says that Guthrie "give us, in effect, little more than a pasticcio of meanings that are marginally relevant to the understanding of what the concept of Logos might mean".
of the meaning\textsuperscript{12}. The first particularities appear in fragment 31: given in deliberate connection with the term "it is measured" (μετρεται) logos seems to acquire a meaning of "proportion"\textsuperscript{13}. This meaning corresponds to μέτρα ("in measures") in fragment 30, of which, according to tradition, fragment 31 is a continuation. Logos (λόγος) and measure (μέτρον) could therefore have the same meaning, although in the logos-fragment (fragment 31) itself it is not quite clear what the nature of that measure might be.

From fragments 45 and 115 we learn that the soul has a logos. Fragment 45 in particular teaches us that the logos of the soul is deep, but the meaning of that depth is not clear. The expression "limits" (πείρατα) which, it seems, corresponds to logos, is not entirely clear; if it is taken as a metaphor, it is unclear how it should be interpreted\textsuperscript{14}. Fragment 115 indicates an "increase" of logos (λόγος αυξον) in the soul, but here too the "increase" is not unambiguously defined\textsuperscript{15}. Only indirectly, through a parallel with fragments 107 and 101, do we get a hint of its cognitive meaning.

There remain three more (of the nine) fragments which are expected to give a direct and unambiguous definition of logos; these are fragments 1, 2 and 50.

Fragment 1 emphasises at the very beginning: this logos exists for ever\textsuperscript{16}. Therefore, it has an extratemporal character, i.e. it should be understood as something independent of the act of cognition which is always linked to the temporal.

\textsuperscript{12} Fr. 87: "A stupid man is wont to get astounded at every (new) word (λόγος)". Fr. 108: "Of all whose teachings (λόγος) I have heard, there is not one who attains to understanding that wisdom is apart from all". Fr. 39: "In Priene lived Bias, son of Teutames, who is of more esteem (λόγος) than the rest".

\textsuperscript{13} Fr. 31b: "Earth is liquefied as sea, and it is measured (μετρεται) in the same logos as existed before it became earth."

\textsuperscript{14} Fr. 45: ψυχής πείρατα ούκ ἔν ἐξεύροιο, πάσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει ("You would never discover the limits of soul, though you should travel every road: so deep a logos has it").

\textsuperscript{15} Fr. 15: ψυχής ἐστι λόγος ἑαυτόν αὐξον ("Soul has a logos which increases itself").

\textsuperscript{16} Fr. 1: τοῖς ὑδάτοις ἐν τοῖς ὑδάτοις ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἡ ἀκούσαντές το πρῶτον. γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τόν λόγον τόδε ἀπειρώμενα ἐν οὐδὲν περιώμενον καὶ ἐπέσω καὶ ἐργον τοιώντων ὁδόιον ἐγὼ διηγείμαι, κατὰ φύσιν διαπέραν ἔκαστον καὶ φερόων ὁδόν ἔχει· τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἅθροίσις λανθάνει ὁδόσα ἐγεγρήγετες ποιούσιν ὅσα αὐτοὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἐπιλαμβάνονται ("Although this logos exists for ever, men prove as unable to understand it when once they have heard it as before they heard it. For, although all things come to pass in accordance with this logos, men seem as if ignorant when they experience such words and things as I explain, distinguishing each thing according to its constitution and showing how it is. The rest of mankind are unaware of what they do while awake just as they forget what they do while asleep"). With regard to the questionable relation of ἄει to the two neighbouring words, here the two opposed assertions are
Then there comes an extremely important assertion: "all things come to pass in accordance with this logos". If something comes to pass (γίνεσαι) in accordance with something else, then, in a sense, the latter governs the former; consequently, the assertion "all things come to pass in accordance with this logos" (γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον) means that logos governs all in the sense of a principle which gives directions, governing "all things". Furthermore, if logos is set against everything else, it is something common in contrast to the particular contained in the "all things".

Fragment 2 confirms that logos is common because its commonness is retroactively illuminated by the "private understanding" (φρόνησις) of the individual in the crowd. Although φρόνησις is given with the meaning of the life wisdom of a community, which means that it contains commonness in itself, what is emphasised here is the aspect of individuality in it (ιδία) with the intention of pointing out the commonness of logos as well.

The contraposition of commonness to particularity is the basis for the contraposition set in fragment 50: "listening not to me but to the logos...". Heraclitus as an individual is not in a position to free himself completely from the limitations of particularity. His discourse always remains personal, an individual discourse. That is why the philosopher retreats before the logos so that the logos may speak for itself. And those who wish to understand will have to be able to listen to the logos in a specific sense, to understand it directly.
Therefore, although common (unprepared) people are not able to understand the logos either before they hear it or once they hear of it (fragment 1), the logos itself can be "heard", understood and interpreted. On the other hand those who know how to reach the logos hidden in things will discover its secret; to them the logos will say: "all things are one" (fragment 50).

Despite the contraposition of "the common and the particular" mentioned earlier, the basic message of fragment 2 is to follow logos as something common, i.e. to live according to it. Therefore it imposes itself also as a practical principle which we should follow in our everyday lives.

Following logos in the nine logos-fragments we come upon data of diverse values. While fragments 39, 87 and 108 give formerly known meanings of logos, fragment 31 hints at its parallel in meaning to measure, and fragments 45 and 115 link logos to the soul with a hint of the moment of cognition. Fragments 1, 2 and 50 contain specific Heraclitean characteristics: logos is the eternal and general principle governing all things; although difficult to reach, its cognition is nevertheless possible and it is liable to interpretation and thus it can and should serve as a practical living principle telling us that all things are one.

This derived definition of Heraclitus' logos gives rise to new questions: in what sense is logos common? How is its governing to be understood? What in fact is the meaning of the assertion "all things are one"?

The principal definitions of logos in the fragments discussed require closer definition, and for this there remains only the context, i.e. the corpus of Heraclitus' fragments as it has come down to us. Since logos will not fully open itself when addressed by name, the only thing left to us is to approach it by a round-about route which leads through a forest of metaphors and parallels. Clearly, the interpretation of metaphors offers an abundance of hidden meanings, but also a doubt as to whether or not we are on the right path. Still, it is Heraclitus' deliberate challenge; he deliberately set the doubtful rambling at the very threshold of his philosophy. One needs to cross from the word to the idea of logos.

3. Logos is common (ξυνός). The commonness is a distinguishable trait of Heraclitus' thought: war is common (ξυνός, fr. 80), world is common (τῶν ἀυτῶν ἄπαντων, fr. 30), law is common (ξυνός, fr. 114). However, this commonness is not a simple sum of particularities, is not derived from them. The commonness of logos is not a product of a consent or agreement between people; Heracli-
Heraclitus discards the "wisdom" of the common human being as an opinion which follows the inherited principles of the community. Such commonness can with time easily degenerate into prejudice or disillusionment\(^{21}\). The commonness of logos is directed towards extratemporaneity (the logos exists for ever). Thus Heraclitus’ wisdom is set in direct opposition to the wisdom of the community, which is dependent on time and customs.

Fragment 114 explains:

"Those who speak with understanding (ξυν νόω) must rely on what is common (ξυνόφ) to all, as a city must rely on its law, and with much greater reliance: for all the laws of men are nourished by one law, the divine law; for it has as much power as it wishes and is sufficient for all and something is still left over\(^{22}\).

The pun on ξυν νόω and ξυνόφ is not accidental\(^{23}\). On the contrary, it should additionally, i.e. formally, link νοός to ξυνόν. νοός is defined as common, and its essence is revealed in a comparison with the law; human laws have their common importance thanks to the fact that they "feed on" (τρέφουνται) a one and unique divine law which is the foundation of their commonness.

The common (τὸ ξυνόν) is ultimately reduced to one (τὸ ἕν). Logos itself, which is said to be common, is consequently reduced to one, as the unique divine law\(^{24}\), as one single principle which governs all things.

However, Heraclitus does not link the idea of "governing all things" exclusively to logos. In a direct or in an indirect way we find in the fragments different principles which "govern all things". Fragment 41 points out:

"Wisdom is one thing: to know the Thought by which all things are steered through all"\(^{25}\). 

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21 K. Axelos (Héraclite et la philosophie, Paris 1971, 85) says: "L’erreur, l’illusion, le mensonge et la bêtise sont également, et sont aussi vrais. Ils n’ont pourtant qu’une forme d’être incomplète, car ils n’expriment que des particularités et des particularisations: ils sont les aliénations de la Sagesse. Tandis que la vérité est universelle, l’erreur est humaine et individuelle".

22 Fr. 114: ξυν νόφ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνόν πάντων, ὥσπερ νόμος πόλις καὶ πολύ ἰσχυρότερος τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπων νόμοι ὥστε ἕνὸς τοῦ θείου χρηστὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτον, ὥσπερ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πάσι καὶ περιγίνεται.

23 Here special attention should be given to Kirk’s suggestion (p. 54): "by θεός he meant more or less the same as is meant by the Logos of fr. 1, the ξυνόν or θείος νόμος of this fragment".

24 Cf. W. Jaeger (Die Theologie der frühen griechischen Denker, Zürich 1953, p. 135): "Der Logos, nach dem alles geschieht und der doch den Menschen verborgen ist, ist das göttliche Gesetz".

25 Fr. 41: ἐν τῷ σοφῷ ἐπιστασθαι γνώμην ὅτεν κυβερνήσαι πάντα διὰ πάντων.
That one and only towards which wisdom strives and "by which all things are steered" is here given the name "thought". The original word, singled out in itself, does not clearly reveal Heraclitus' intention. This is to be looked for in the context. Heraclitus uses a metaphor: the Thought steers (κυβερνήσαι). Steering is an expression which means governing a ship as subject to governance as a whole. Logos is also a principle according to which "all things come to pass", i.e. by which all things are governed, and that means that λόγος and γνώμη are identified in a common context.

In fragment 64 the idea of governing is again given particular expression:
"A thunderbolt steers all things".

Thunderbolt (κεραυνός) here can only be interpreted as a metaphor. According to the mythical image, it belongs to Zeus, and that indirectly means that the thunderbolt which "steers all things" is Zeus himself, master of gods and humans. But in following the line of this metaphorical interpretation, the thunderbolt, as Zeus’ specific weapon, can also symbolise war. After all, war, according Heraclitus, is also "father of all and king of all" (fr. 53). Fragment 80, in which it is emphasised that "all things come about (γίνεσαι) by strife", supports this assumption and additionally points to the parallel with logos. The thunderbolt in fragment 64 leaves room for yet another, third, metaphorical interpretation: the thunderbolt, that is, can here be identified also with fire, and not any fire, but the "celestial, the purest" mentioned in fragments 30 and 31. Does this mean that fire too governs all things?

Fragment 11 also speaks indirectly of governing:
"Every animal (πᾶν ἔρπετόν) is driven to pasture with a blow".

Πᾶν ἔρπετόν can refer primarily to animals, and then also to humans, in an ironical sense. The blow could be the blow of the thunderbolt; in a final instance that would again be Zeus or perhaps one of the principles of governing mentioned earlier: logos, Thought, fire...

26 W. A. Heidel (Proc. Amer. Acad. of Arts and Sciences 48 (1913) 700) is the first to contest the interpretation that γνώμη is the name of the divine principle governing the world (advocated by Zeller, Diels and Kranz) defining it as Stoic. Heidel was later joined by Reinhardt, Gigon and Kirk, who take γνώμην as an internal accusative of ἐπιστασθαι. But we then encounter the problem: what governs what? Kirk attempts to find a solution in the translation: "Wisdom is one thing: to be skilled in true judgement, how all things are steered through all" (386). But how can this unusual idea of an "all-inclusive mutual steering" be reconciled with Heraclitus' repeated insistence on the one principle which governs all things (in frs. 32, 64 and 114)?

27 Fr. 64: τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰκοδίζει κεραυνός.
28 Cf. Conche (p. 304): "κεραυνός désigne le feu ouranique. Or c'est là le feu le plus pur, le feu purement feu."
29 Fr. 11: πᾶν γάρ ἔρπετόν πληγην νέμεται.
30 Some parallels in Homer (Il. 17, 446; Od. 4, 418) indicate that there is room here for a metaphorical (ironic) meaning of ἔρπετόν in the sense of "man".
The question posed in fragment 16 hints at something similar:

"How could anyone escape the notice of that which never sets (τὸ μὴ δύνον)"31?

δύνειν is ascribed to celestial bodies, usually to the sun; it sets at regular intervals. But what is that which, unlike the sun, never sets? The thought that anyone can or wishes to hide from "that which never sets" means that the latter takes care of him, watches over him, or perhaps even controls him. Is that some new form of the principle which governs all things, or is it again logos, Thought, Zeus, fire, war or law?

Based on the parallels listed the impression is created that the idea of logos as the one which governs all things leads in fact to the multiplication of that very one and unique principle.

4. Of course it would be absurd to accept the idea that a number of principles of common governing appear simultaneously in Heraclitus, especially when he himself emphasises on more than one occasion the one and only principle as opposed to the many. There is a possibility of interpreting metaphorically the relation between the listed principles of governing, but there are no clear indications as to the direction to be followed in such a metaphorical interpretation: is fire a metaphor for logos, or war for Zeus, and where is the ultimate point to be sought?

On the other hand, it is clear that λόγος here is just one of the names for the principle which governs all things. Therefore, that principle can, but does not have to, be named as logos. The problem of naming is specifically stressed in fragment 32:

"One (being), the only wise (ἐν τῷ σοφῷ μονόν), is both unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus"32.

Owing to its vagueness, ἐν τῷ σοφῷ cannot serve as a starting point for the interpretation. Its meaning is revealed in relation to its being called by the name of Zeus; it "is willing" to be called by the name of Zeus, which means that we can expect that it will be in some way identified with this deity. The essential message of the fragment is revealed in the fact that ἐν τῷ σοφῷ is at the same time "unwilling" to be called by that name, i.e. to be identified with Zeus.

In his interpretation, O. Gigon relies precisely on the problem of the naming:

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31 Fr. 16: τὸ μὴ δύνον ποτε πῶς ἐν τις λάθοι;
32 Fr. 32: ἐν τῷ σοφῷ μονόν λέγεσθαι σὺν ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα.

With this assertion Heraclitus joins the long tradition of the re-definition of the meaning and an expansion of the notion of Zeus, together with Pherecydes of Syros, Theagenes of Regia and Xenophanes as his predecessors and Empedocles as his successor. Gigon is of the opinion that the naming of ἐν τὸ οοφόν as Zeus in the quoted fragment in Heraclitus, is his concession (Konzession) to traditional belief: it is greater than the concession made by Xenophanes, who still leaves his one and only god (as opposed to traditional polytheism) unnamed34. In this interpretation, however, there is one question which remains unanswered: why would an uncompromising critic of the religion of the crowd, such as Heraclitus was, make concessions to traditional belief?

The explanation of the meaning of what was said in fragment 32 is hidden in the "unwilling/willing“ attitude which is not to be interpreted literally. It is, namely, "both unwilling and willing“ to be called by the name (λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἔθελε καὶ ἔθελε... ὄνομα) of Zeus; therefore, it is in a passive state. Hence what matters is what anybody is going to call it. In this case, it is obviously Heraclitus himself who is both unwilling and willing ἐν τὸ οοφόν to call it thus, and who advises others to follow his example. The philosopher puts forward his own experience in the naming of ἐν τὸ οοφόν.

In his persistent effort to define the principle which governs all things, Heraclitus comes to Zeus as the "master of gods and people“. Revealing this idea in the form of a mythical concept, which in the eyes of the early Greek philosophers was fragmented into a number of different meanings, Heraclitus separates out only its basic meaning of divine omnipotence. Zeus figures in Heraclitus’ idea of a principle which governs all things as an image of an absolute master.

On the other hand ἐν τὸ οοφόν "is unwilling“ to be called by the name of Zeus, as it cannot identify itself completely with that mythical concept burdened with a variety of layers of meaning. With one part of himself Zeus figures in ἐν τὸ οοφόν and with the rest of himself (the mythical, expanded and complex symbolism) he does not. Thus, the partial participation of the concept of Zeus in the idea of ἐν τὸ οοφόν makes the game of "unwilling-willing“ possible. And

33 Gigon, 139.
the game itself will serve Herclitus to emphasise his key attitude: there is no traditional concept (name) which can express completely the principle which he provisionally names as ἐν τὸ σοφόν. All these familiar, inherited concepts only partially reach its essence, throw light on only one of its aspects, partially, and they too with only a part of themselves.

This is the explanation of the simultaneous existence of a variety of names for the principle of general governance in Heraclitus' fragments. One and the same idea is being revealed under the different names. Once it is given through a mythical image (Zeus), then as a metaphor (Zeus' thunderbolt, the whip) which has a tendency to expand in meaning (an ever-living fire, strife...); then we find it unnamed ("that which never sets"), and in yet other fragments it is given a name which points to a common idea, Thought (γνώμη); lastly we come to logos.

What we encounter here is the wide-spread idea of the development of early Greek thought from a mythical image to a philosophical idea. But still, the problem lies in the fact that in Heraclitus' fragments we find all these names used at the same time, and in fragment 32 he even insists on that simultaneity in the form of a multiform-naming. In it, the mythical image, the metaphor and the philosophical concept exist side by side, simultaneously.

They are not mutually exclusive, but rather cooperate in the defining of the principle ἐν τὸ σοφόν. The wide spectrum of names for the "only wise" speaks of Heraclitus' repeated attempts to define his idea. It demonstrates that Heraclitus never gave up on the mythical form of expression.

5. The multiform naming of ἐν τὸ σοφόν in Heraclitus is a result of his use of a traditional language which cannot completely express his new, specific concept. He insists on exhausting all the possibilities this language offers him in order to reach the principle, to shed light on it from different sides and to create from this variety of cognitive rays a unique shaft of light.

However, this experience in naming reveals not only the inadequacy of the traditional language and the philosopher's labours to exhaust all its possibilities, but also speaks, indirectly, of the complexity of the concept which needs to be explained. He does not find the one and only name which would adequately express this idea in its wholeness and would dismiss all the other names of ἐν τὸ σοφόν. The

35 Cf. О. М. Фрейденберг, Миф и литература древности, Москва, 1978.
many names of ἐν τὸ σοφόν are not only a reflection of the limited possibilities of the Greek language at that time, but are also evidence of its many faces i.e. forms. It is precisely because of this that the use of any single name is taken as denoting one single meaning, which comes down to a restriction of the concept and to an impoverishment of the idea.

The identity in meaning of the names for ἐν τὸ σοφόν is not revealed solely in connection with the idea of governing; identification is present in other cases as well. In fr. 30 the "ever-living fire" and "the world", i.e. κόσμος, are identified; justice appears in the role of a supreme judge (fr. 28), as does fire (fr. 66); the world is "the same for all" (fr. 30), i.e. common in the same way as logos in fragment 1, and war is "king", which is to say master of all (fr. 53), since "all things come about by strife" just as "all things come to pass in accordance with logos" (fr. 1).

Many interpreters of Heraclitus take logos as the starting point for a number of different identifications. The most frequent is the identification of logos and fire, and at other times there is a sequence of three components (logos=fire=Zeus), or four (logos=fire=eity=world) or of six components (logos=fire=Wise=thunderbolt=war), and there are even cases where logos is identified with all the more significant ideas in Heraclitus.

36 See fr. 30: κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτόν ἀπάντων... ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἐστιν καὶ ἔσται... πυρ ἀείζωον... ("This world, the same for all... always was and is and shall be: an ever-living fire...").
37 See fr. 28: Δίκη κατα/.ήψεται ψευδών τέκτονας καί μάρτυρας ("Justice shall overtake the artificers and witnesses of lies").
38 Fr. 66: πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρίνει καί καταλήψεται ("Fire will come and judge and convict all").
39 See fr. 53: πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἔστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς... ("War is father of all and king of all...").
40 Cf. Guthrie, 432 ("The material aspect of the Logos is fire"); Kirk ("Logos, which is closely related to this κόσμος, is thought of as a material component of the things to which it is "common", it is thought of as a form of fire", p. 70 and "Fire is not a metaphor... it is the embodiment of the Logos", p. 396); Marcovich, 117 maintains that "the identification of the Logos with Fire" does not seem likely, but he accepts that "Logos in some measure might be thought of as 'corporeal'"
41 Cf. Jeannière, 50 ("Et c'est sans doute dans cette identification du feu, du logos et de Zeus que se trouve la clé de l'énigme").
42 Cf. Axelos, 125 ("Dieu. le logos, le cosmos, le feu s'unissent sans s'identifier De même, les contraires s'unissent, mais ne s'identifient pas...").
43 Fink (in M. Heidegger, E. Fink, Héraclite. Séminaire du semestre d'hiver 1966–1967, traduit de l'allemand par J. Launay et P. Lévy, Paris 1973) says: "Il se pourrait que le λόγος du fragment 1, soit un autre mot pour le σοφόν du fragment 41, pour le Κεραυνός du fragment 64, comme pour πῦρ et πόλεμος" (p. 18) and "La foudre, le feu, le soleil, la guerre, λόγος et σοφόν sont des directions différentes du regard de la pensée vers un seul et même fond" (p. 19).
Still, the identification in meaning is not completely achieved in any of the cited instances; it never brings about a complete, in fact absurd, eradication of the differences between the component items\(^{45}\). What has been said about the calling by the name of Zeus (in relation to fr. 32) can also be said of fire, war, world...: εν τό οὐφόν is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of fire, war, world... With a part of themselves they figure in the definition of εν τό οὐφόν, throwing light on one particular aspect of it, and here their meanings interfere while expressing the basic specific meanings which reveal their essence. For instance, through a part of its meaning fire is "ever-living" is identified with the world (fr. 30) and with the everlasting logos (fr. 1); in another place (fr. 66) fire is allotted a metaphorical role as judge of all and is thus identified in function with Δίκη, the goddess of justice who is also judge (fr. 94). In fragment 90 fire comes to the fore with a commonness which sets it apart from everything else: "All things are an equal exchange for fire and fire for all things"\(^{46}\). The idea of commonness leads to the idea of identification with the commonness of logos or war; but seen in the context of fragment 90, the commonness of fire is revealed as different from that of logos or war. Regardless of whether the exchange of "all things" for fire in Heraclitus is seen as a succession or as simultaneous\(^{47}\), the commonness of fire comes from its position as something opposed to "all things" as a one in contrast to the world of fragmented particularities. Fire is common to "all things" because it is opposed to all things and enters into exchange together with all of them. The commonness of logos, war or Thought, on the other hand, results, as has been illustrated, from their position as forms of a principle which governs all things. In both these cases it is said that all things are one, but this unification is achieved in different manners. In the case of fire the unification is achieved by making fire the foundation of "all things". All things are reduced to fire, and conversely, all things come about from fire.

It is therefore clear that, for instance, the "ever-living fire" in fragment 30 is not only a metaphor for eternity\(^{48}\), but rather something more, and much more important: the fire which is "kindled in measures and extinguished in measures" is set in opposition to all things and, in the process of exchange, is capable of swallowing all things so that they will again come about from it; such fire is the foundation of all that exists. Here Heraclitus follows the line on the

\(^{45}\) Axelo, 125 points out: "Il y a fusion, mais non confusion".

\(^{46}\) See fr. 90: πυρὸς ἀνταμοιβή τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἄπανταν...

\(^{47}\) See. Kirk 347 contra Gigon, 47f.

\(^{48}\) Cf. Ramnoux, 104 ("Feu fait un sujet possible pour: il vit toujours ... Le feu pâlit pour devenir un simple signe du Toujours Vivant").
development of cosmology of the philosophers of Miletus\textsuperscript{49}; his fire stands for the idea of ἄφων in the Milesians, meaning water in Tales or air in Anaximander. In fragment 31 this "cosmic fire" has a special status: completely separated from the turnings of earth, water and prester which it represents on a meteorological level, here it also retains the meaning of foundation: the three participants in the turning are merely its specific manifestations\textsuperscript{50}. Heraclitus uses fire in a similar manner as he uses logos: he sets apart its traditional meanings with the intention of throwing light on ἔν τὸ ὕσσον from different angles. Fire gives ἔν τὸ ὕσσον eternity in a metaphorical sense, drawing that characteristic from its mythical divine origin\textsuperscript{51}, while, in another place, it follows the philosophical concept of the principle, i.e. the philosophical context of ἄφων.

The third significant expression of ἔν τὸ ὕσσον as a principle of unification is found in fragment 10; here the assertion that "out of all things there can be made a unity, and out of a unity all things“ is given as a conclusion to the originally outlined connections (συλλάψεις) of unification\textsuperscript{52}. "Things whole and things not whole, something which is being brought together and something which is being brought apart, something which is in tune and something which is out of tune“ – these are just a few selected examples which should point to the essence of this kind of unification. Thus outlined, in some other fragments this idea emerges and forms itself through mythical images and metaphors in the basis of which is war ("War is

\textsuperscript{49} Vlastos ("On Heraclitus", American Journal of Philology 76 (1955) 362) argues that "Heraclitus found the cosmological pattern" for his "cosmological fire" built up by the Ionian philosophers.

\textsuperscript{50} There are many indications that fire (πῦρ) in fr. 31 does not figure directly in the changes: 1. The punctuation mark indication the beginning of an enumeration completely separates fire from what follows in the sentence (πῦρος τροπαί· πρῶτον βάλασσα, βαλάσσαις δὲ τὸ μὲν ἡμῖν γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἡμῖν πρῆστήρ); 2. Fire cannot be the first stage in the change, as suggested by H. Jones ("Heraclitus, Fragment 31", Phronesis 17(1972)195), since the punctuation mark is clearly followed by πρῶτον θάλασσα; 3. The components taking part in the changes are, then, sea, earth and prester, with the last one (πρῆστήρ) appearing in the role of a substitute for fire (possibly in the sense of "visible" as opposed to "invisible", "pure" cosmic fire, as suggested by Lassal, Gigon, Ramnoux); 4. Fire is completely set apart by the fact that what we have here are "turnings of fire" (as substratum), and not turnings of the sea or earth.

\textsuperscript{51} West (p. 173) believes that "Heraclitus would not naturally have turned to fire without some particular stimulus. Such a stimulus could have been given by observation of the extraordinary status accorded by the Persians to fire. Besides the theory of fire pervading earth, plants, and animals, it is in place to recall the doctrine of the soul’s ascent from earthly fire to the fires of heaven".

\textsuperscript{52} Fr. 10: συλλάψεις δῆλα καὶ οὐχ ὄλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνδόν διάδον· ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐκ ἐνός πάντα. Here συλλάψεις is adopted in accordance with the arguments put forward by Kirk, 170, and Marcovich, 165–7.
father of all and king of all" – fr. 53; "justice is strife" – fr. 80). In fragment 8 we come across the name in which this idea will be conceptually formed:

"The finest harmony is composed of differing elements".

The links of unification go in both directions, from one end to the other. As in the case of logos and fire, harmony (ἁρμονία) is revealed on a number of levels of meaning. In fragment 51 it appears in the image of the strung bow, then in music. In fact, in terms of its origin, harmony indicates a complex mechanical composition. In fragment 54 Heraclitus is clearly underlining his idea of a common harmony, completely formed in the philosophical notion of "invisible harmony" set in direct opposition to the "visible". Harmony, that expression of the principle of unification as a pure philosophical notion, is here entirely freed from what is perceived by the senses and is determined by being in contrast to mythical images and phenomena on the level of the everyday.

Heraclitus is once again following the line of investigation outlined by his direct predecessors, the Milesians, within the framework of the old idea of a strife of opposites rendered in different ways: warm–cold, wet–dry. On the other hand, Heraclitus' harmony in its dynamic form is a response to the statically imagined harmony in Pythagoras.

From this survey of the meanings of Heraclitus' basic terms it can be seen that his fundamental interest is to determine the principle of all-inclusive unification provisionally denoted as ἐν τῷ οὐσίῳ.

53 Fr. 80: εἰδέναι χρῆ τὸν πόλεμον ἐόντα ξυνὸν καὶ δίκην ἔρην καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ’ ἔρην καὶ χρεοῦν ("One must know that war is common, and justice is strife and that all things come about by strife and necessity").

54 See fr. 8: ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν...

55 Fr. 51: οὐ ἔννοιαν δικαίως διαφερόμενον ἐώτυτο ἐξειρέται: παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη δικαίως τὸξου καὶ λύρης ("They do not apprehend how being at variance it agrees with itself: a backward–turning adjustment like that of the bow or lyre").

56 P. Jr. Ilievski ("The Origin and Semantic Development of the Term Harmony", Illinois Classical Studies 18 (1993) 19–29) explains that the word ἁρμονία is derived from the Mycenaean a-mo /h)armo/ which appears quite often on the Knossos and Pylos Linear B tablets dealing with chariots and chariot equipment. "Its meaning here is not "chariot", but "wheel", as is proved by the ideogram *143, a circle with crossed lines (= 4 spokes), which follows this word "(p. 21). This technical term (h)armo, created in the Mycenaean society, "continued to be used in the derivatives ἁρμόζω and ἁρμονία... Since remote times the term ἁρμονία had begun to be used in a metaphorical sense, and to spread its meaning from the material into the intellectual sphere. Along with the concrete meaning as an instrument for joining and fastening two things together (Od. 5, 248), in Homer it was used with an abstract meaning, "convenant", "agreement" (cf. II. 22, 254–55)..." (pp. 23–4):

57 Fr. 54: ἁρμονίη ἀρτανής φανερῆς κρατίττων ("Invisible harmonia is stronger then visible").

58 Vlastos (358): "Heraclitus' thought is more intimately connected with Anaximander's than... any of the modern interpreters have recognized".
Here Heraclitus is not the originator, but simply takes up the pursuit of the principle of unification set up by his immediate predecessors. However, he discovers that the relation of the one-opposed-to-all is much more complex than it must have seemed to the Milesians. The unification is manifold. In his striving to reveal the many faces of έν το ουφόν Heraclitus makes many attempts, again and again returning to this idea with the intention of illuminating it from a great many angles. In the end, the complexity of the notion is reflected as its multiform naming. έν το ουφόν is given many names, none of which can completely express its complex nature. The different names for έν το ουφόν complement one another in meaning and are partially mutually identified. At that, some of them preserve their own characteristic meanings, which help the preservation of their recognizability within the interference between their meanings. Thus fire is set apart as a special and outstanding expression of the idea of the substratum as a principle of unification, despite all its partial identifications with the cosmos. Harmony too figures partially in the identification with war and justice, but the idea of unification in harmony is still dominantly articulated as a unity of opposites.

The question posed now is: does logos, in contrast to all the other forms of the principle of governing all things, preserve a specific kind of meaning of its own?

6. In the above survey of the different forms of the principle of "governing all things" (section 3), the intention was to set apart its specific nominal forms: logos, thunderbolt, Thought, law... What all these have in common is that in a way they all govern all things; that is the foundation of their mutual interference of meanings. However, they do not govern in an identical manner.

Heraclitus constantly uses different names when naming the very act of governing. His most impressive expression is the image of governing of a ship: in fragment 41 Thought steers (κυβερνήσω) all things through all things; in fragment 64 the thunderbolt too steers (οίκιζει) all things. The use of the term for steering (in two variants) requires our special attention. Steering, as a metaphor, includes three original specific meanings: first, it means that what is go-

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59 Sri Aurobindo (Heraclitus, Calcutta 1947) points out that "as in Indian, so in Greek philosophy the first question to thought was the problem of the " One and Many" (10); after (12) he says "on this truth of eternal oneness and eternal multiplicity Heraclitus fixes and anchors himself; from his firm acceptance of it, not reasoning it away but accepting all its consequences, flows all the rest of his philosophy".

60 Heidegger and Fink (12) pay special attention to the notion of "steering", but interpret it as a "illumination" of all things (in a metaphorical sense), linking it to κεραυνός (thunder/lightning). Conche (303) puts forward an argument for the refutation of the possibility of such an interpretation: "Il ne faut pas confondre la foudre et l'éclair, comme le font Heidegger et Fink ... Les Grecs distinguent κεραυνός, la foudre, βροντή, le tonnerre, et στεροπή, l'éclair. L'essentiel n'est donc pas l'éclairement...".
verned is a thing (a ship) which is in motion; second, steering represents the determination of a course in that motion towards a definite destination; third, what we have here is a direct steering from the outside, from some factor which is not an essential part of the ship itself; that is, more precisely, its helmsman (the ship would still be a ship even without the helmsman). Therefore, we have this special relation between that which is steered (the ship) and that which does the steering (the helmsman) using compulsion from the outside.

The next phase of the development of the idea of governing is found in fragment 11, where the compulsion (from the outside) is given the form of crude despotism: "every animal is driven to pasture with a blow". In fragment 114 the relation ἐν τῷ σοφόν - τὸ πᾶν is expressed in two ways; on the one hand we recognize the direct way of governing under compulsion in the expression κράτει (κράτος) and on the other hand there appears the relation of the subordination of τὸ πᾶν to ἐν τῷ σοφόν contained in the metaphor of "nourishing" 61: "all the laws of men are nourished (τρέφονται) by one law, the divine law". Here already the governing of ἐν τῷ σοφόν does not contain the ingredient of compulsion but rather, embodied in the divine law, it is transformed into a kind of participation (μέθεξις) as an obscure predecessor to Plato’s solution of the relation between the common (the idea) and the particular (the individual object).

In the expression "all things come about by strife" (γινόμενα πάντα κατ’ ἐριν) given in fragment 80, we can still recognize traits of the inherited mythical image 62, but here the verb γίνεσθαι is used in the sense of a process, i.e. a change.

Finally, in the expression "all things come to pass in accordance with this logos" (γινομένων γάρ πάντων κατά τὸν λόγον τόνδε) in fragment 1, the metaphorical manner of expression is completely abandoned and the idea of governing, linked to logos, is completely formed as a notion.

The use of the verb γίνεσθαι is not accidental. γίνεσθαι means: genesis (γένεσις), change, transformation in accordance with logos. Further on in this assertion made in fragment 1 Heraclitus offers his personal cognitive experience in discovering logos:

"For, although all things come to pass in accordance with this logos, men seem ignorant when they experience such words and things as I explain, distinguishing each thing according to its constitution (κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἐκαστὸν) and showing how it is" 63.

61 See fr. 114 (n. 22).
62 Heraclitus inherits the idea of ἐρις in its mythical form from Homer and Hesiod, but constructs his view in opposition to its philosophical definition in Anaximander (fr. 1) as opposed to δίκη (v. Kirk, 239-40; Vlastos, 356-7). Here ἐρις is taken as a common principle of all change (becoming and perishing), without regard to the moral.
63 See fr. 1 (n. 16).
There is no doubt that Heraclitus explains the "coming to pass (γένεσις) of all things in accordance with this logos by an analysis (διαιρέων) of each particular thing according to its constitution (φύσις). This is his didactic, but quite probably also his cognitive method. Logos is reached gradually, through the analysis of the constitution of each individual thing.

More recently, φύσις has been defined as having the meaning of constitution as opposed to its traditional interpretation as "nature". The meaning of "constitution" (structure) is reached on the basis of the use of φύσις in Homer. It is thought that Heraclitus too in fragment 1 (as well as in fr. 123) gives this word the same meaning. However, the question of crucial importance here is whether Heraclitus restricts himself only to the meaning of "constitution". It is a positive fact that the word φύσις, derived from the root φυ-, also contains the meaning of "growth". From some examples of early Greek philosophy it can be seen that the meaning "growth", though not so frequent, was nevertheless present (for example, in Empedocles). Later on Aristotle, among others, contributed significantly to the development of the meaning of "growth" in the word φύσις, which indicates that this meaning too has been present in philosophy over a long period.

It is precisely because of this that we have no reason not to believe that both these meanings of φύσις (constitution and growth) coexisted, lived side by side in Heraclitus, though it is possible that the notion of growth was on a secondary level, as a feature of the constitution of each individual thing. After all, this is confirmed by the wholeness of Heraclitus' thought in which there dominates the...
idea of incessant change. Therefore, the complex meaning of φύσις is, in Heraclitus, defined as a constitution which is in constant growth; each individual thing has its own internal constitution, i.e. a structure which defines it as individual and recognizable among all other things. However, this structure is not static, but rather in a constant process of change and transformation. Growth is understood in the sense of genesis (γένεσις)\(^\text{68}\): incessant change and transformation, a becoming and perishing, a motion in both directions.

The passage quoted from fragment 1 shows that the process of the constant change of the structure of each individual thing is not chaotic and aimless. All comes into being, grows, is transformed and perishes in accordance with logos (κατὰ τὸν λόγον). In fragment 80 the idea of that permanent change is given clearer and closer determination: "all things come about by strife and necessity" (γινόμενα πάντα κατ’ ἔριν καὶ χρεών), meaning the change is conducted through some conflict of opposed forces, and not accidentally (arbitrarily) but "by necessity" (κατὰ χρεών).

Yet precisely because it "governs" from the inside, from the interior of each individual thing, logos does not do this by force. Embodied in logos (in contrast to the thunderbolt, Thought...) the act of governing is manifested as an expression of the inner powers of transformation of each individual thing, it is an expression of the changeability of their inner constitution.

It appears that precisely this omnipresent logos inspired the question posed in fragment 16:

"How could anyone escape the notice of that which never sets?"

Nobody can escape that which never sets or rises, that which never appears and perishes periodically, but is everpresent inside the constitution of all things, and thus in us, humankind.

Fragment 45 clearly testifies that our soul has a "deep logos". Our soul too carries logos in its constitution (φύσις); it is also governed by logos. Man cannot escape the logos which is in himself, in his soul.

But, paradoxically enough, the logos, though eternal and omnipresent, and inbuilt in the very constitution of all that is, even in us, it is still not also obvious. Fragment 123 warns that "the constitution of things is accustomed to hide itself"\(^\text{69}\), and this makes it very difficult to reach the logos in it. One must know how to approach it. Fragment 1 refers us to "an analysis (διαίρεσις) of the constitution", whereas in fragment 50 we come across the metaphor "listening to the logos". Heraclitus tells us not to listen to him personally talking

\(^{68}\) Cf. Jaeger (31): "φύσις (. . .) bezeichnet noch ganz anschaulich den Akt des φύναι d.h. das Wachsen und Hervorgehen als Prozeß...". Jaeger claims that φύσις and γένεσις are synonyms (31 and 227–8).

\(^{69}\) Fr. 123: φύσις χρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ.
about logos, but to logos itself. In contrast to the possibility of the logos being heard indirectly, from the one interpreting it, the act of listening now acquires the meaning of an independent, deepened and immediate perception of the constitution of things.

The "listening to logos" itself, on the other hand, is not defined exclusively as listening to the agitated constitution of things outside us. Fragment 115 teaches us that the "soul has a logos which increases itself".\(^{70}\)

The increase of logos (here given entirely vaguely) is given a corresponding framework of meaning in the context of fragment 107 where the soul is "barbarian" if it fails to understand the messages received from the senses.\(^{71}\) Soul is defined as men’s tool in the interpretation of information received through the senses, i.e. as an extraordinary instrument of cognition.\(^{72}\) On the other hand, in the cognitive make-up of the soul logos itself acquires a cognitive meaning. Hence, its "increase" in the soul needs to be understood as a cognitive growth; logos itself increases (grows) with the increase of knowledge in the soul. The expression "which increases itself" (ἐαυτὸν αὐξῶν) gives this cognitive growth an element of self-reference. The logos in the soul does not necessarily increase (grow) cognitively only on the basis of external information received through the senses. It increases of itself, focused on its own inner being. Logos recognises itself in the soul; here it reaches selfconsciousness: that which perceives and that which is perceived are one and the same. It seems that it is precisely on the basis of this experience that Heraclitus said: "I searched myself" (fr. 101).\(^{73}\)

This seemingly bold statement is in fact a consistent application of the assertion that logos is the foundation of the entirety of our cognition. Present in the constitution of all things just as in the constitution of the soul which perceives, logos is common, one and the same for all. Perceived in one thing, it is then easily recognised in other things. The recognition of the logos in individual things is a confirmation of the credibility of our cognition; it is the criterion of truth. The truth based on the manifold revelation of logos in many different things is defined in the essential meaning of ἀλήθεια (that which is revealed).


\(^{70}\) Fr. 115: ψυχῆς ἔστι λόγος ἐαυτὸν αὐξῶν.

\(^{71}\) Fr. 107: κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποιν ὁφθαλμοί καὶ ὅτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἔχοντων.

\(^{72}\) Cf. M. C. Nussbaum, "ψυχή in Heraclitus", *Phronesis* 17 (1972) 15.

\(^{73}\) Fr. 101: ἔδιξησάμην ἐμεωτῶν.